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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
HERBERT L. SMART, individually 
and as Director of Finance of 
the State of Utah, and DAVID 
SMITH MONSON, individually and 
as Auditor of the State of Utah, 
Defendant-Appellants. 
Case No. 14924 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
UTAH HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for declaratory judgment, 
declaring the constitutionality of a state statute, the 
Utah Housing Finance Agency Act, Utah Code Annotated 
§63-44a-l, et seq, (Supp. 1975) (hereinafter the "Act"), 
and for mandamus ordering the defendant state officials 
to honor the Utah Housing Finance Agency's (hereinafter 
the "Agency") request for funds appropriated to it under 
the Act. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This matter was argued to the Court upon cross 
motions for summary judgment, supported by affidavits and 
memoranda* The Court determined that the Act was in all 
respects constitutional, and issued the requested writ of 
mandamus. Subsequently, the writ was stayed pending the 
prosecution of this appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-appellee seeks affirmance of the judg-
ment below as to each and every issue presented to the 
trial court, the lifting of the stay imposed pending the 
appeal, and enforcement of the writ. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts contained in defendant-
appellants1 brief is adequate. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE UTAH HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY ACT SERVES A 
PUBLIC PURPOSE. 
Defendant-appellants claim (Point IB, Appellants1 
Brief) that the Act and appropriations thereunder, are 
-2-
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unconstitutional because the Act does not serve a public 
purpose. It is not questioned that public funds may not 
be spent for other than public purposes. However, the 
question whether such legislation as the Utah Housing 
Finance Agency Act serves a public purpose has been liti-
gated in numberous sister states, and on this ground the 
constitutionality of the legislation invariably has been 
sustained. California Housing Finance Agency v. Elliott, 
131 Cal. Rptr. 361 (Calif. 1976); Rich v. State of Georgia, 
et al., 227 S.E.2d 761 (Ga. 1976); In Re Constitutionality 
of ORS 456.720, 537 P.2d 542 (Ore. 1975); State ex rel 
Warren v. Nusbaum, 59 Wis. 2d 391, 208 N.W.2d 780 (1974); 
West v. Tennessee Housing Development Agency, 512 S.W.2d 
275 (Tenn. 1974); State ex rel West Virginia Housing 
Development Fund v. Waterhouse, 212 S.E.2d 727 (W. Va. 
1974); Opinion to the Governor, 112 R.I. 151, 308 A.2d 
809 (1973) ; Johnson v. Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency, 
453 Pa. 329, 309 A.2d 528 (1973); Minnesota Housing Finance 
Agency v. Hatfield, 297 Minn. 151, 210 N.W.2d 298 (1973); 
Maine State Housing Authority v. Depositors Trust Co., 278 
A.2d 699 (Maine 1971); Martin v. North Carolina Housing Corp., 
277 N.C.29, 175 S.E.2d 665 (1970); New Jersey Mortgage Finance 
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Agency v. McCrane, 56 N.Jo 414, 267 A.2d 24 (1970); 
Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency v. New England 
Merchants Natfl Bank, 356 Mass. 202, 249 N.E.2d 599 (1969); 
Walker v. Alaska State Mortgage Association, 416 P.2d 245 
(Alaska 1966). Vermont Home Mortgage Credit Agency v. 
Montpelier National Bank, 262 A.2d 445 (Vt. 1970). 
The Act contains a declaration of public purpose 
in Section 63-44a-2. In that section, the legislature 
declares it the policy of the State to assist the pro-
vision of decent, safe, sanitary housing for the citizenry 
where private institutions fail to do so* There is then 
contained a finding that such a failure has occurred in 
that a lack of available financing has caused a decrease 
in housing starts and in the transferability of existing 
housing, with a resulting serious shortage of decent housing 
for persons of low and moderate income* Such a shortage, 
the legislature finds, leads to unemployment in the housing 
industry and to the creation of blight and slums. The 
legislature therefore specifically declares it a public 
purpose for the State to cooperate with private institutions 
to increase the amount of reasonably available financing for 
the construction, purchase, and rehabilitation of decent, 
low and moderate income housing. 
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Such legislative findings are entitled to great 
respect, and may be disregarded only to the extent that 
they are incorrect or unreasonable on their face. E.g., 
Allen v. Tooele County, 21 U.2d 383, 445 P.2d 994 (1968); 
Thomas v. Daughters of the Utah Pioneers, 114 Utah 108, 
197 P.2d 477 (1948); Lehi City v. Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 
48 P.2d 530 (1935). 
In the Court below, plaintiff submitted the 
affidavits of officers of four major Utah lending institu-
tions and of an official of the Department of Community 
Affairs of the State of Utah, attesting the kind of facts 
upon which the Legislature based its findings. No counter 
affidavits were submitted, and no question was raised by 
defendants as to the truth or validity of the affidavits 
submitted by plaintiff. Where the problem described by 
the legislature so plainly exists, the concern of the courts 
is merely whether the problem falls within an area of 
legitimate legislative concern, and whether the method 
adopted by the legislature for dealing with the problem 
is reasonably calculated to have the desired effect. 
Thomas v. Daughters of the tah Pioneers, supra; Lehi City 
v. Meiling, supra; West v. Tennessee Housing Development 
Agency, supra. 
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The matter of a serious shortage of safe, 
sanitary, decent housing for a large segment of the 
citizenry falls squarely within the police power of the 
legislature to deal with the health, safety, and morals 
of the populace. E.g., Rich v. State of Georgia, supra; 
State ex rel Warren v. Nusbaum, supra; Maine State Housing 
Authority v. Depositors Trust Co., supra; Martin v. North 
Carolina Housing Corp., supra; Walker v. Alaska State 
Mortgage Association, supra. Courts which have discussed 
the matter indicate numerous ways in which making decent 
housing more readily available beneficially effects the 
health, safety and morals of the public. 
Making it possible for a greater number of low 
and middle income persons to purchase homes gives a greater 
number a stake in society, and encouragement to be pro-
ductive wage earners, and thus tends to stabilize society. 
State ex rel Warren v. Nusbaum, supra; Martin v. North 
Carolina Housing Corp., supra. 
Increasing the transferability of low and middle 
income housing by increasing financing therefor, and 
increasing the availability of funds for home improvements 
on such housing, tends to prevent the creation of blight and 
slums and the consequent unsafe, overcrowded and unsanitary 
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conditions which breed crime and disease. State ex rel 
Warren v. Nusbaum, supra; MaineState Housing Authority 
v. Depositors Trust Co«, supra; Martin v. North Carolina 
Housing Corp., supra. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the 
redevelopment of blighted and slum areas is a public pur-
pose for which public funds may be spent. Tribe v. Salt 
Lake City, Corp., 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975). 
It cannot be said that the finding of the legis-
lature that a public purpose is served by increasing the 
availability of financing for construction, purchase, and 
rehabilitation of low and moderate income housing, is 
incorrect or unreasonable on its face. Regarding defendants' 
objection that the Act does not serve a public purpose, then, 
it reamins only to be seen whether the method chosen by the 
legislature to remedy the problem defined is reasonably 
calculated to have the desired effect. 
The general scheme chosen by the legislature, dis-
cussed in detail in the Facts section of Appellants1 brief, 
is a common one. Stated briefly, the Agency is authorized 
to obtain tax free funds by the issuance of bonds and notes, 
which it uses to provide low interest financing for low and 
moderate income housing. Debt created by the sale of notes, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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bonds, and other obligations is payable only out of funds 
of the Agency, so that such obligations are self-liquidating. 
At least one court has specifically addressed the problem 
whether such a method is reasonably calculated to serve the 
public purpose of increasing financing for low and moderate 
income housing, holding that it is. West v. Tennessee 
Housing Development Agency/ supra. Generally the same 
method was employed by the agencies involved in all of the 
other sister state cases cited above, so that insofar as 
each finds that a public purpose is served by the legisla-
tion there involved, each implicitly finds that raising low 
interest funds for financing by sale of tax exempt self-
liquidating bonds is an acceptably effective means of 
accomplishing the public purpose. The method is familiar 
in Utah, where it has been approved for various public 
purposes. E.g., Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp., supra 
(city urban renewal bonds); Allen v. Tooele County, supra 
(county bonds for industrial development); Conder v. 
University of Utah, 123 Utah 182, 257 P.2d 367 (1953) 
(University bonds for dormitory construction); Spence v. 
Utah State Agricultural College, 119 Utah 104, 225 P.2d 
18 (1950) (State College bonds for construction). 
The Housing Finance Agency Act serves a public 
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purpose in that it is intended, and reasonably designed, 
to alleviate an actual and existing problem having a 
significant effect upon the public health, safety, and 
welfare. 
POINT II. 
ANY PRIVATE BENEFITS CONFERRED BY THE ACT ARE 
MERELY INCIDENTAL TO ITS DOMINANT PUBLIC PURPOSE. 
Appellants assert (Point IB, Appellants' Brief) 
that the Act is constitutionally offensive because its 
operation will confer certain private benefits. There is 
an obvious private benefit to persons who are able to 
obtain housing financing through the Agency who would not 
have been able to obtain it elsewhere. There is a less 
substantial benefit to mortgage lenders who participate 
in the Agency1s mortgage transactions. These benefits, 
however, are merely incidental to the dominant purpose of 
the Act to alleviate a serious statewide shortage of decent 
low and moderate income housing, with its consequent ill 
effects. While it is improper to spend public funds for 
private purposes, such private benefits incidental to a 
dominant public purpose do not detract from the constitu-
tionality of the legislation. 
-9-
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In Tribe v, Salt Lake City Corporation, supra, it 
was charged that urban renewal legislation was unconstitu-
tional insofar as the proposed renewal projects would confer 
benefits upon adjoining private landowners. The Court held 
that these private benefits were incidental to the public 
purpose of clearing slums and blight, and thus not disposi-
tive of the question of constitutionality. The legislation 
was held constitutional. See also Thomas v. Daughters of 
the Utah Pioneers, supra. 
It is immaterial, of course, whether the incidental 
private benefits conferred by the legislation are viewed as 
particularly "personal"• What could be more "personal" than 
the education provided by public universities, the food and 
clothing provided by public welfare subsidies, the medical 
attention underwritten by public medicare programs, all 
of which have been found constitutionally proper? 
The private benefits which may result from the 
operation of the Housing Finance Agency Act are not dif-
ferent in kind from those described in Tribe. They are 
equally incidental to the main public purpose of the Act, 
and do not affect its constitutionality. This question has 
been discussed and decided in favor of similar legislation 
-10-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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in many of the sister state cases previously cited. See, 
State ex rel Warren v. Nusbaum, supra; Massachusetts Hous-
ing Finance Agency v, New England Merchants Natyl Bank, supra; 
Vermont Home Mortgage Credit Agency v> Montpelier National 
Bank, supra; Opinion to the Governor, supra; New Jersey 
Mortgage Finance Agency v, McCrane, supra; West v. Tennessee 
Housing Development Agency, supra. 
POINT III. 
THE ACT INVOLVES A MATTER OF STATEWIDE CONCERN, 
PROPERLY DELEGATED TO A STATE AGENCY. 
Appellants claim (Point IV, Appellants1 Brief) 
that the Act violates Article VI, §28 of the Utah Constitu-
tion, which prohibits delegation to a "special commission, 
private corporation or association, any power to make, 
supervise, or interfere with any municipal improvement, 
money, property or effects . • . or to perform any municipal 
functions.ff See Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp., supra. The 
question central to such a claim is whether the Agency, in 
assisting in providing low and moderate income housing, is 
performing an essentially municipal function rather than 
dealing with a matter of statewide concern, properly dele-
gated to a state agency. It cannot be seriously contended 
-11-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that the Agency can make or supervise municipal improvements 
or interfere with municipal money, property, or effects* 
In Carter v, Beaver County Service Area No* 1, 
16 U.2d 280, 399 P.2d 440 (1965), the Court struck down, as 
violative of Article VI, §29 (now §28), legislation allowing 
counties to create a "service area", an agency of the state, 
to provide numerous extended services, including "without 
limitation" the following: 
* * •extended police protection; struc-
tural fire protection; culinary or irri-
gation water retail service; water con-
servation; local park, recreation or 
parkway facilities and services; cemeteries; 
public libraries; sewers, sewage and storm 
water treatment and disposal; flood control; 
garbage and refuse collection; streetlighting; 
airports; planning and zoning; local 
streets and roads; curb, gutter and 
sidewalk construction and maintenance; 
mosquito abatement; health department 
services; hospital service . * . 
The Court found that in the form enacted the County Service 
Area Act would allow the creation of a state agency which 
could perform peculiarly municipal functions. However, as 
subsequently amended to avoid being overly inclusive, the 
legislation was subsequently upheld under Section 29 (now 
Section 28) of Article VI, in Branch v. Salt Lake County 
Service Area No* 2, 23 U.2d 181, 460 P.2d 814 (1969)* 
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The purpose of Article VI, Section 28, is to 
preserve the right of local self-government to the localities, 
and to prevent the state from interfering in the internal 
affairs of cities and towns. Carter, supra; State Water 
Pollution Control Bd. v. Salt Lake City, 6 U.2d 247, 311 
P#2d 370 (1957). In Water Pollution Control Bd. v. Salt 
Lake City, the Court held that while the Board had a legiti-
mate function of preventing pollution of the state1s waters 
on a statewide basis, it could not prescribe the internal 
operation of a pre-existing city sewage system. In that 
case, the Court defined "municipal functions11, for the 
purposes of Section 28, as being any and all functions in 
which a city or town may properly engage, whether proprietary 
or governmental. 
It seems clear at once that expanding the credit 
market for home financing for low and moderate income per-
sons is not a regular internal function of cities and towns. 
The present case does not present the Carter situation in 
which, due to overbreadth of the legislation, the agency 
might usurp an ordinary city function such as construction 
of sidewalks or streetlighting. This is not the Water Pollu-
tion Control Board case, in which a state agency seeks to 
-13-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
supervise an existing municipal improvement performing a 
historically municipal service. There appears no historic 
precedent in Utah for municipalities engaging directly in 
the housing credit market. It does not appear how partici-
pation by a state agency in home financing has any tendency 
to interfere with the right of local self government . 
Tribe, supra, holds that urban renewal is a matter 
of statewide concern within Article VI, §28. Certainly the 
strongly related function of preventing shortages of decent, 
safe, sanitary housing is equally a matter of statewide 
concern. State ex rel Warren v. Nusbaum, supra, the only 
case appellee has found which considers the question under 
a provision such as Section 28, specifically so holds. 
The Housing Finance Agency Act does involve a 
matter of statewide concern properly delegated to a state 
agency. It has no tendency to invade any right of any 
municipality to govern its internal affairs* It does 
not violate Article VI, Section 28 of the State Constitution. 
POINT IV* 
THE HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY CANNOT CREATE STATE 
DEBT OR PLEDGE THE CREDIT OF THE STATE. 
-14-
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Appellants allege (Points I and II, Appellants1 
Brief) that the sale of bonds and notes by the Housing 
Finance Agency will result in the lending of state credit 
in favor of the Agency in violation of Article VI, Section 
29 of the State Constitution and the creation of state 
debt in violation of Article XIV, Section 1 of the State 
Constitution* 
Debts and obligations of the Agency are payable 
solely out of funds of the Agency, ordinarily comprising 
proceeds from bonds and notes and payments on loans. 
Section 63-44a-15 (1). The Act specifically provides that 
debts of the Agency cannot become debts of the state, that 
the credit of the state cannot be lent in favor of the 
Agency, and that funds of the state cannot be obligated to 
pay debts of the Agency. Section 63~44a-15. All notes 
and bonds of the Agency must bear a disclaimer to such 
effect. Id. The Utah law is very plain that such self-
liquidating notes and bonds of state agencies are not debts 
of the state and do not effect a lending of the state's 
credit. Spence v. Utah State Agricultural College, supra; 
Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp,, supra; Allen v. Tooele County, 
supra. 
-15-
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Spence considered legislation authorizing the State 
College to issue bonds to raise construction funds. The 
legislation provided that the bond debt should be payable 
only out of revenue of the buildings constructed, and not 
out of tax revenue of the state, and that the bonds should 
bear a legend to that effect. The Court held that plain-
tiff's claim of creation of state debt was controlled by 
the "special fund doctrine11: where bonds of a state agency 
are payable only out of a special fund comprised of revenues 
of a facility to be constructed with the bond proceeds, 
there is no creation of state debt because tax monies are 
not obligated. See also Conder v. University of Utah, 
supra. In short, unless the legislation creates a binding 
obligation upon state revenues raised by taxation, there 
is no creation of state debt. 
Tribe reaches the same conclusion with regard to 
notes and bonds of a quasi-municipal corporation: where 
the legislation provides that the notes and bonds shall 
be payable out of revenue of facilities to be constructed, 
and shall not be city debt, and the bond resolution and 
ordinance, and bond form, all prohibit the use of city 
credit to pay the bonds, no city debt is created and there 
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is no lending of city credit in violation of the applicable 
constitutional provisions. See also Allen v. Tooele County, 
supra, regarding county obligations. 
An agency which supports itself by the sale of 
self-liquidating notes and bonds in no way obligates the 
state to raise or spend tax revenues, and therefore creates 
no state debt. 
The Housing Finance Agency Act also provides, 
however, that the Agency must maintain a capital reserve 
fund sufficient to cover currently maturing obligations. 
Section 63-44a-12. Should current income be insufficient 
to meet this requirement, an additional appropriation 
may be sought from the legislature to cover the deficit, 
and the legislature may make such an appropriation. 
Sections 63-44a-12, 66-44a-19. In short, the legislature 
may make future appropriations to defray the obligations 
of the Agency. It has been charged in a number of the 
housing finance agency cases from sister states that such 
provisions constitute a lending of state credit and the 
creation of state debt because they indicate that recourse 
may be had to state funds to pay agency obligations where 
agency funds are insufficient. It does not appear that such 
-17-
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provisions have been considered in a Utah case. 
The courts which have considered the question 
uniformly base their decisions on a distinction whether 
the legislation obligates the state to make future appro-
priations to pay agency debt, or merely permits it to do 
so. If the legislation requires the legislature to make 
future appropriations to defray agency obligation, the 
legislation may be invalid as lending state credit and 
creating state debt. See In Re Constitutionality of ORS 
456.720, supra, distinguishing Gibson v. Smith, 531 P.2d 
724 (Ore. 1975); Casey v. South Carolina Housing Authority 
264 So. C. 303, 215 S.E.2d .184 (1975). (But see Massa-
chusetts Housing Finance Agency v. New England Merchants 
Natyl Bank, supra, and Maine State Housing Authority v. 
Depositors Trust Co., supra, holding that legislation man-
datory in form is permissive in effect, insofar as one 
legislature has no power to bind a future legislature to 
appropriate.) If, on the other hand, the legislation 
merely permits the legislature to make such appropriations, 
without requiring it to do so, it creates no binding obliga-
tion upon the state, and thus results in no lending of state 
-18-
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credit or creation of state debt. California Housing 
Finance Agency v. Elliott, supra; State ex rel Warren 
v. Nusbaum, supra; Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency 
v. New England Merchants Natyl Bank, supra; Maine State 
Housing Authority v. Depositors Trust Co., supra; Opinion 
to the Governor, supra; State ex rel West Virginia Housing 
Development Fund v. Waterhouse, supra; Martin v. North 
Carolina Housing Corp., supra; Minnesota Housing Finance 
Agency v. Hatfield, supra; Walker v. Alaska State Mortgage 
Assoc., supra; In Re Constitutionality of ORS 456,720, 
537 P.2d 542 (Ore. 1975). 
The Utah statute is of the latter type. It 
permits, but does not require the legislature to make 
future appropriations to the Agency. (Nor would it be 
appropriate to imply any requirement in the Act despite 
its language, since it also appears to be the Utah rule 
that one legislature has no power to bind a future legis-
lature. See the discussion of the prohibition of irre-
pealable laws in Thomas v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 
supra, 197 P.2d at 497.) That being so, the legislation 
creates no binding obligation upon future tax revenues, 
and thus cannot result in the lending of state credit or 
the creation of state debt. 
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Supposing that the capital reserve fund pro-
visions of the Act are not unconstitutional insofar as 
they create no binding obligation of the state to pay 
future debts of the Agency, some question may still be 
raised whether any actual future appropriation made by 
the legislature in response to a felt "moral obligation11 
would be constitutional. It appears that they would be 
entirely proper. 
Certainly the fact that the Act may be inter-
preted as creating a flmoral obligation1,1 of the state to 
pay future debts of the Agency does not make it uncon-
stitutional as lending state credit or creating state 
debt. See Conder v. University of Utah, supra, 257 P.2d 
at 370. So long as the legislature, at the time an appro-
priation is sought, is not legally bound to appropriate 
but may make an independent decision, no state debt or 
commitment of state credit is involved. Otherwise, the 
question appears to be controlled by the rule that the 
legislature may appropriate for any public purpose. The 
Agency, as discussed heretofore, serves a public purpose, 
and any appropriation to the Agency for that purpose is 
valid. Retirement of Agency debt serves that purpose. 
The specific question was presented in Maine State Housing 
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Authority V, Depositors Trust Co., supra, Massachusetts 
Housing Finance Agency v. New England Merchants Nat1! 
Bank, supra, and State ex rel West Virginia Housing 
Development Fund v. Waterhouse, supra, under similar con-
stitutional provisions, and in each case the court held 
that such future appropriations would be valid. See 
278 A.2d at 709; 249 N.E.2d at 609-610; 212 S.E.2d at 731. 
This Court should rule that any future appropriation of 
the Utah legislature to the Utah Housing Finance Agency, 
whether to retire bond debt or for any other end in 
furtherance of the Agency1s public purpose, would be con-
stitutionally proper. 
Appellants base their claim that the Act will 
affect a lending of the statefs credit in large part upon 
the idea that "the appropriation of state funds constitutes 
a flending of creditf.f! This argument is said to be based 
upon a "line of cases" represented by Button v. Day, 208 
Va. 494, 158 S.E.2d 735 (1968). In fact, the argument 
appears to be nothing more than a misreading of the somewhat 
confusing opinion in Button v. Day. Appellees are unable 
to find any other case which takes such an extreme position. 
In fact, Button v. Day itself does not take the 
extreme position alleged by appellants. If mere appropriation 
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were an unconstitutional lending of credit, then, of 
course, the legislature could never appropriate. What 
was (properly) found offensive in Button v. Day is that 
the legislation created a "guarantee fund11, of public 
tax monies, to pay off private loans for the construc-
tion of privately owned industrial plants, where the 
private borrowers defaulted. The legislation contained 
an initial appropriation for the guarantee fund. Obviously, 
and as the Virginia Court found, this legislation bound 
the state in future (when there was a default) as a guar-
antor of private debts. In defense of the legislation it 
was urged that it permitted only a single, present appro-
priation, for the public purpose of stimulating industrial 
growth. The Court found this distinction immaterial: the 
purpose was to guarantee private debts with public monies, 
and that was unconstitutional whether the money was appro-
priated now or in future when the loans went bad. The 
Court merely held that the none shot11 appropriation was 
not a defense in that case, not that present appropriation 
in and of itself violates the lending of state credit pro-
hibition found in most state constitutions. 
Button v» Day has no bearing upon the present 
case, because the present Act provides for no guarantee 
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fund. None of the public funds appropriated under this 
Act, or which can be appropriated under this Act, can be 
applied on any private debt under any circumstances. 
POINT V. 
PROPERTY OF THE HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY IS 
PROPERLY EXEMPT FROM TAXATION. 
Article XIII, Section 2, of the Utah Constitution 
provides generally that all tangible property in the state 
not constitutionally exempt, shall be taxed in proportion 
to its value. Section 3 of Article XIII requires the 
legislature to enact uniform rates of assessment and taxa-
tion on such property. Section 10 of Article XIII subjects 
corporations and persons presently doing business in the 
state to taxation on their property owned or held locally* 
Appellants claim (Point III B, Appellant's Brief) that the 
Housing Finance Agency Act violates these provisions of the 
State Constitution insofar as it provides, in Section 
63-44a-16, that all Agency property, and all notes and bonds 
thereof, together with interest payable thereon and income 
derived therefrom, shall be exempt from all forms of taxation. 
The answer to this contention, however, is found 
in Article XIII, Section 2 itself, which also provides that 
"The property of the state . . . shall be exempt from 
taxation.f! Property held and used by an agency of the state Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
for a public purpose is state property exempt from taxation. 
In short, this contention is answered by the prior discussion 
of the public purpose of the Act: since the public purpose 
of the Act is clear, Agency property used for such purpose 
is exempt. See Allen v. Tooele County, supra, holding that 
county industrial development bonds, proceeds therefrom and 
payments thereon, are properly tax exempt as public property 
serving a public purpose. Such tax exemption has frequently 
been alleged in opposition to similar housing finance agency 
acts, but the statutes have been upheld by every court which 
has ruled on the matter* Rich v. State of Georgia, supra; 
State ex rel Warren v. Nusbaum, supra; West v. Tennessee 
Housing Development Agency, supra; Johnson v. Pennsylvania 
Housing Finance Agency, supra; Martin v. North Carolina 
Housing Corp., supra; Minnesota Housing Finance Agency 
v. Hatfield, supra. 
POINT VI. 
THE ACT DOES NOT INVOLVE AN IMPROPER DELEGATION 
OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY. 
No doubt, and as appellee has argued earlier 
herein, the matters with which the Housing Finance Agency 
Act deals are matters of statewide concern, as to which 
only the legislature has power to make laws under Article 
V, Section 1 and Article VI, Section 1 of the State Con-
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stitution. Appellants allege (Point V, Appellant's 
Brief) that the Act is an improper attempt by the legis-
lature to delegate its law making authority as to such 
matters to the Agency. 
The legislature may not, of course, simply cede 
to an agency its authority to make law on any subject. 
See State v. Goss, 79 Utah 599, 11 P.2d 340 (1932); Clayton 
v. Bennett, 5 U.2d 152, 298 P.2d 531 (1956). On the other 
hand, authority to make rules and regulations for the 
carrying into effect of a policy prescribed by the legis-
lature may be conferred upon an administrative agency. In 
such a case, the legislation will be upheld if the legis-
lature has provided sufficient standards for procedure and 
decision as to confine the potential action of the agency 
within the bounds of the legislative policy. State v. 
Goss, supra; Clayton v. Bennett, supra; Western Leather & 
Finding Co. v. State Tax Commission, 87 Utah 277, 48 P.2d 
526 (1935). 
The Housing Finance Agency Act accords the Agency 
power to make rules and regulations for the implementation 
of the Act. The Act, however, also contains comprehensive 
standards confining Agency power to implementing a clearly 
and completely defined legislative purpose. The authority 
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granted the Agency to make rules and regulations — found 
in Section 63-44a-9(a), 63-44a-5(3), and 63-44a-10 -- is 
authority to regulate the conduct of the business of 
housing finance specifically prescribed to the Agency by 
the legislature and to control and dispose of the property 
of the Agency. The power and duties of the Agency are set 
out in comprehensive detail in Sections 63-44a-4, 5, 9, 10 
and 11. No authority is conferred upon the Agency to 
regulate the property or conduct of third persons, as is 
ordinarily complained of in cases arising under these pro-
visions of the Utah Constitution. E.g., State v. Goss, 
supra; Clayton v. Bennett, supra; Western Leather & Finding 
Co. v. State Tax Commission, supra. 
The authority of the Agency to internally regulate 
the disposition of its own business and property, as clearly 
defined by the legislature, does not involve any power to 
make law as to any subject. The detailed specification by 
the legislature of the business in which the agency may 
engage and the property it may hold provide ample standards 
of conduct and decision to avoid a bare delegation of legis-
lative power. 
Section 63«44a-3(6) does permit the Agency to 
determine who are "low and moderate income persons" entitled 
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to the benefits of the Act. The decision, however, is to 
be made based upon specific criteria set forth. The legis-
lature may commit to administrative agencies factual deci-
sions as to the applicability of legislation, so long as 
the standards for decision are spelled out. Clayton v. 
Bennett, supra. 
The objection that housing finance agency legis-
lation such as Utah!s involves an improper delegation of 
legislative power was made and disposed of in favor of the 
legislation in Rich v. State of Georgia, supra; State ex 
rel Warren v. Nusbaum, supra; Vermont Home Mortgage Credit 
Agency v. Montpelier Nat'l Bank, supra; Johnson v. Pennsyl-
vania Housing Finance Agency, supra; Opinion to the Governor, 
supra; State ex rel West Virginia Housing Development 
Fund v. Waterhouse, supra; Martin v. North Carolina Housing 
Corp., supra; New Jersey Mortgage Finance Agency v. McCrane, 
supra; West v. Tennessee Housing Development Agency, supra. 
POINT VII. 
THE ACT DOES NOT CREATE A CORPORATION BY 
SPECIAL ACT. 
Article XII, Section 1, of the Utah Constitution 
provides that corporations may be created under general 
law, but may not be created by special law. Appellants 
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allege (Point III A, Appellant's Brief) that the Housing 
Finance Agency Act violates this section because it creates 
an agency in corporate form by special act. 
In fact, the Agency is a "body corporate and 
politic11 of the State. It is not an ordinary corporation 
in the sense of the constitutional prohibition. While 
there appear to be no cases in point under Article XIII, 
Section 1, there are dispositive rulings under the related 
provision of Article XI, Section 5, which forbids the 
legislature to create "corporations for municipal purposes11 
by general law. 
In Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 119 Utah 214, 226 
P.2d 127 (1950), it was claimed that creation of an improve-
ment district by a county pursuant to statute violated 
Article XI, Section 5. The Court questioned whether the 
improvement district in fact performed municipal functions 
and whether the legislation in question was a "special 
law.11 In any case, the Court said, the improvement district 
was not a corporation under the constitutional provision. 
Since the improvement district operated separately and 
independently of any municipal authority, and had no control 
over municipal property or functions, it was to be considered 
a separate arm of the state government performing a public 
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purpose. As such, it was not within the constitutional 
prohibition. The same result was reached in Freeman v. 
Stewart, 2 U.2d 319, 273 P.2d 174 (1954). 
As discussed earlier herein, the Housing Finance 
Agency has been created to perform a statewide function 
and a public purpose. It is an independent arm of the 
state government, not a corporation. It is, therefore, 
not within the prohibition of Article XIII, Section 1. 
POINT VIII. 
THE ACT DOES NOT CREATE A CORPORATION FOR 
MUNICIPAL PURPOSES BY SPECIAL ACT. 
The foregoing discussion is also dispositive 
of appellants1 contention that the Housing Finance Agency 
Act creates a municipal corporation by special act. 
POINT IX. 
THE ACT IS A GENERAL, NOT A SPECIAL, LAW. 
No special law may be enacted where a general 
law would be applicable. Article VI, Section 26, State 
Constitution. Appellants claim (Point IV, Appellantfs 
Brief) that the Housing Finance Agency Act is a special 
law. The Housing Finance Agency Act is a general law 
within the meaning of the constitutional provision. 
The leading Utah case on the subject appears to 
b e
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concerning the Liquor Control Act of 1935. As against the 
contention that the act in question was a "special law", 
the Court set forth the following definitions: 
Laws which apply to and operate 
uniformly upon all members of any class 
of persons, places, or things requiring 
legislation peculiar to themselves in 
the matters covered by the laws in ques-
tion, are general and not special . . . 
Special legislation is such as relates 
either to particular persons, places, 
or things, or to persons, places, or 
things which, though not particularized, 
are separated by any method of selection 
from the whole class to which the law 
might, but for such legislation, be 
applied, while a local law is one 
whose operation is confined within 
territorial limits, other than those 
of the whole state or any properly 
constituted class or locality therein. 
94 P.2d 414 at 420. See also Tygesen v. Magna Water Co.> 
supra. 
Under these definitions, it is immaterial that in 
a given instance a law may apply to a narrow group or locale. 
The law is a special and not a general law only if by its 
terms, it must apply only to a particular limited class or 
locale. 
The Housing Finance Agency Act applies uniformly 
to all low and moderate income persons. It contains a 
specific finding of the legislature that the legislation is 
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required for this particular class. It contains no special 
or local limitations confining its operation to particular 
persons, places, or things. It applies likewise to all 
persons and all parts of the state. It is clearly a general 
rather than a special law. 
POINT X. 
THE ACT CREATES NO IRREVOCABLE FRANCHISE, 
PRIVILEGE, OR IMMUNITY. 
The Housing Finance Agency Act provides in Section 
63-44a~14 that the State shall not interfere with the rights 
granted the Agency to fulfill its contracts with bond 
holders, or impair the right of bond holders thereunder, 
until the obligations are discharged. It has occasionally 
been argued as to such legislation, as appellants assert 
here (Point VI, Appellant's Brief), that such a pledge of 
the State confers an "irrevocable franchise, privilege, or 
immunity11 upon bond holders in violation of such a provision 
as Article I, Section 23 of the Utah Constitution. See, 
Johnson v. Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency, supra. 
In fact, the benefit conferred by this provision 
is neither irrevocable, nor a "franchise, privilege, or 
immunity.11 The benefit, by its terms, terminates when the 
Agency1s obligation is discharged. It is, therefore, not 
irrevocable. The provision in fact, merely implements 
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Article I, §18 of the Utah Constitution and Article I, 
Section 10, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution 
prohibiting the State from enacting any law impairing the 
obligation of contracts. The result under the Housing 
Finance Agency Act would be precisely the same if it did 
not contain Section 63-44a~14, because of the State and 
federal constitutional provisions to the same effect. The 
benefit conferred by Section 63-44a-14, therefore, cannot 
be a "franchise, privilege, or immunity11 in violation of 
Article I, §23 of the State Constitution. 
POINT XI. 
THE ACT DOES NOT PERMIT IMPOSITION OF TAXES 
FOR THE PURPOSES OF ANY COUNTY, CITY, OR TOWN. 
Finally, Appellants contend (Point IV, Appellantfs 
Brief) that the Housing Finance Agency Act permits the 
legislature to impose taxes for the purposes of a county, 
city, town, or other municipal corporation in violation 
of Article XIII, Section 5, of the State Constitution. 
Clearly the Act permits (rather than requires) 
the legislature to appropriate tax monies to the purposes of 
the Agency. To the extent, however, as discussed earlier, 
that such purposes are statewide, public purposes, it is 
clear that the Act does not permit taxation for county, city, 
town, or municipal purposes in violation of the State 
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Constitution. 
POINT XII. 
DEFENDANTS HAVE A DUTY TO PROCESS PLAINTIFFfS 
REQUEST FOR FUNDS. 
The Housing Finance Agency Act is constitutional 
in all respects. The appellants have each a statutory duty, 
which may be compelled by mandamus, to process the Agency1s 
request for funds, and, if the same is in proper form and 
within the appropriation, to issue a warrant upon the 
Treasury for the funds. 
The duty of the Director of Finance is defined 
by Section 63-38-11, Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1969), which 
provides: 
The director of finance shall exercise 
budgetary control over all state departments, 
institutions and agencies . . . The director 
shall examine and approve or disapprove all 
requisitions and requests for proposed expen-
ditures of the several departments . . . and 
no requisitions of any of the departments 
shall be allowed nor shall any obligation be 
created without the approval and the certi-
fication of the director* 
Under the same section, the Director shall approve the 
disbursal of funds upon request if the request is within the 
budget of the agency and current appropriations therefor. 
See also Section 63-38-10. 
The duty of the State Auditor in this regard 
substantially antedates the creation of the office of 
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Director of Finance, since it derives from Article VII, 
§17 of the Utah Constitution, which provides the "The 
Auditor shall be Auditor of Public Accounts . . . and .. 
• . . shall perform such other duties as may be provided 
by law.11 In Preece v, Ramp ton, 27 U.2d 56, 492 P.2d 
1355 (1972), it was held that the latter part of this 
provision includes the duty to approve or disapprove 
warrants upon the Treasury, which duty the Auditor had 
performed as of the date of adoption of the State Consti-
tution. 
No funds may be obtained from the State Treasury 
except upon presentation of a warrant therefor to the 
Treasurer. See Section 67-4-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
By Section 67-4-4, enacted in 1963, it was attempted to 
consolidate the function of issuing warrants upon the 
Treasury with the budgetary functions of the Department of 
Finance* The section was held unconstitutional in Preece 
v. Rampton, supra, which held that while the Auditor could 
not be divested of his constitutional function of approving 
or disapproving warrants, the clerical function of drafting 
warrants for approval could be conferred upon the Department 
of Finance. The modern practice under the foregoing author-
ities is that requests for funds are directed to the Depart-
ment of Finance, where they are reviewed for compliance Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
with the budgets and appropriations, and, if the request 
is approved, a warrant is drafted and conveyed to the 
Auditor for approval. If the Auditor concurs that the 
request is within budgets and appropriations, the warrant 
may be presented to the Treasurer. No valid warrant may 
be obtained without the approval of both the Director of 
Finance and the Auditor. In short, what had been the 
historic function of the Auditor — to examine and approve 
requests for funds and issue warrants therefor -- is in 
modern practice shared by the Auditor and the Director of 
Finance. 
When the function was performed by the Auditor 
alone, it was held that mandamus would lie to compel per-
formance of the function. Nelson v. Clayton, 2 Utah 299 
(1878-1879). In that case, the Auditor refused to audit 
the accounts of the warden of the penitentiary or to issue 
a warrant on the Treasury for the sum shown by such accounts, 
though there was a current appropriation to defray the 
wardenfs costs of operating the penitentiary. The Court 
found that the duty to audit the account, and, if the 
account were found correct, to issue the warrant, was 
statutorily required, and issued the writ of mandamus to 
the Auditor accordingly. 
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No claim has been raised in this matter that 
the Agency's request for funds is outside its budget or 
appropriation. The Agency has sought only the specific 
amounts appropriated to it by the legislature. Appellants' 
response is merely that the Agency is not constitutionally 
created. Appellants are incorrect in the latter regard: 
they have each a statutorily imposed, ministerial duty to 
review and approve the Agency's request for funds and issue 
a warrant therefor on the Treasury. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Housing Finance Agency Act is in all 
respects constitutional. Particularly, it is constitu-
tional under each and every provision of the Utah Consti-
tution asserted by appellants . The Court should affirm the 
judgment below so declaring. 
Appellants have each a statutory, non-discretionary, 
ministerial duty to review the Housing Finance Agency1s re-
quest for funds appropriated to the Agency, and if the 
request is proper and within the appropriation, to approve 
the same and issue a warrant upon the State Treasury for 
the funds. Appellants do not claim that the request is 
improper or not within the appropriation. They merely assert 
that the Act is unconstitutional. The request is proper 
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and within the appropriation. The Act is consti-
tutional. The Court should sustain the issuance to the 
defendants of a writ of mandamus ordering them forthwith 
to review and approve the Agency's request for funds, and 
to issue a warrant for such funds upon the State Treasury. 
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